Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 20
including the developmenta
l/certification costs to
33.4 MUSD. The cost of
33.4 MUSD was adjusted for inflation @ 3.5
per cent
per annum from the
year 2000 to arrive at the basic cost of
47 MUSD to the base year of 2010 for
delivery.
Besides, an amount of 20.4 MUSD
was added towards additional
fitments/fixtures viz. Glass Cockpit and Self Protection Suite etc. which were
not included in the cost of the basic he
licopter offered. With this, the cost of
the AW-101 helicopter (without the pa
ssenger cabin modification) was
benchmarked at 67.4 MUSD.
We did not get any evidence in support of
the reasonableness
of base price of
27 MUSD adopted by the CNC for the y
ear 2000. Since the RFP was issued in
September 2006, there was no rationale fo
r adopting the base price of 2000.
In contrast, we noticed that the ba
sic price of AW-101 VIP helicopter was
18.2 MUSD in the year 2010 as seen from the internet.
The benchmarked cost as worked out by
the CNC was Euro 727
6
million
(
`
4877.5 crore) as agai
nst the estimated
total project cost of
`
793 crore approved
by Ministry in January 2006. This was
more than six times the estimated cost.
Further, the offered cost of the vendor
was Euro 592 million (
`
3966 crore). This
was much below the benchmarked cost
of Euro 727 million (
`
4877.5 crore).
Thus, the benchmarked cost was higher
by 22.80
per cent
.
Ministry in respect of estimation of cost
stated (March 2013) that the figure of
`
793 crore (inclusive of
manpower cost worth
`
3 crore) was the ‘Rough Order
of Magnitude’ (ROM) cost estimated fo
r basic helicopter along with spares,
GSE/GHE
7
and the cost of infrastructure at
the time of preparation of SoC in
2006. It further added that the cost of
basic helicopter did not include other
elements like development and certification
cost, cost of fitments and fixtures
6
1 Euro =
`
67
7
GSE/GHE – Ground Support Equipment/Ground Handling Equipment
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 21
for VVIP transportation, Self Protecti
on Suites etc. nor did it factor in
escalation taking into account the
anticipated period of delivery.
Ministry’s reply is not acceptable as th
e offered price was more than six times
the estimated cost which indicates th
at Air HQ had not prepared proper
estimates of the requirement while submitting the case for approval of AoN.
Ministry of Finance (MoF) had also poi
nted out (July 2009)
that the difference
between the final negotiated price and
estimated cost at the time of AoN
appeared to be abnormally high.
We also observed that the benchmarked
cost did not provide a realistic basis
for comparison with the offered
cost of AW-101 helicopter.
In response to the Statement of Case
issued by Audit (July 2010), Air HQ
stated (June 2012) that the benchmar
king committee and the CNC took into
consideration realistically all the requi
rements that are specific to the VVIP
communication including VVIP furnishing,
safety features and security
installation. The information used for benchmarking had necessarily to be
from open source as no western helic
opter in the VVIP class had been
contracted by the GoI or any of its agenci
es. It further stated that it would be
erroneous and misleading to make comp
arison between helicopters without
taking into account their different capabilities, specifications, features,
operational roles and life cycle costs as
well as the widely different design and
pricing philosophies that may be involved.
Ministry replied (April 2013) that
the procurement case lacked a clear
reference base for comparison since th
ere had been no previous procurement
of such helicopters by the IAF. The
benchmarking was done by the CNC using
information from all available source
s and the final benchmarked price was
arrived at in a rational and considered
manner. The figure of USD 27 million
adopted by the Benchmarking Committee was taken from
www.deagel.com
.
Ministry also stated that out of se
ven contracts concl
uded across the globe
between 1991 and 2007, six contracts were signed between 1991 and 2001
while the seventh was signed in 2007.
Hence, 2000 was adopted for purpose
of benchmarking and thereafter escalated
as per the approved rate in the
Pricing Policy Review Committee.
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 22
The reply of Ministry is not acceptabl
e as Paragraph 15 of DPP-2006 specifies
that RFI should ask the vendor to provide
all the elements
which need to be
structured into the costin
g of the weapon / equipment system (including that of
a comprehensive maintenance / product s
upport package) which will serve as
a guideline to formulate an all encompa
ssing Commercial Offe
r format at the
stage of the RFP. We noticed that
no such request has been made in
compliance of the above provision. This
assumes greater significance in view
of the fact that the CNC has no clear refere
nce base to arrive at a realistic cost.
Thus, despite the emphasis laid
in Paragraph 51 of the DPP-2006 on
determination of reasonabl
e price by CNC, for the purpose of benchmarking,
the same was not achieved.
10 Approval by Cabinet
Committee on Security
Following the approval of CNC, the draft note to Cabinet Committee on
Security (CCS) was submitted (Februar
y 2009) by Ministry of Defence (MoD)
to Ministry of Finance (MoF) for
comments/concurrence. MoF on 12 March
2009, sought clarifications wh
ich were responded to by
MoD in March itself.
MoF sought further clarifications on
19 May 2009 which were responded to
by MoD in June 2009. On 20 July 2009, MoF
stated that they were unable to
support the proposal in light of certain c
oncerns raised by MoF, which were to
be addressed in the final Note to CCS.
We observed that the MoF shoul
d have either recommended, not
recommended or recommended with conditions the proposal as MoF provides
financial advice to CCS and Government.
MoD submitted (November 2009) their proposal to the CCS for obtaining
sanction for the procurement of the heli
copters and associated items at the
negotiated cost of
`
3726.96 crore.
We observed that the CCS while according approval, had considered all the
issues which had the benefit of advice
of the representatives of MoD and MoF
and had then taken a conscious
decision (January 2010) which
inter alia
stated
that while the RFP for the present pr
ocurement was issued on 27 September
2006 and it has taken more than three year
s for the tendering process and field
evaluation to be completed, it would take
another three years for the helicopter
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 23
to be made available by th
e manufacturer. Further, th
e CCS also stated that if
the process of tender and field evaluation
is to be repeated, the period involved
would be very long and not acceptable fr
om the point of view of the VVIP
security.
11 Deviations from Defence Procurement Procedure
Paragraph 75 of DPP-2006 stipulates th
at any deviation fro
m the prescribed
procedure will be put up to the RM through DPB for approval.
As per the provisions of Paragraph 31
of DPP-2006, after the issue of RFP, a
number of queries relating to the RFP ma
y be raised by th
e vendors. It should
be ensured that all the queries are answer
ed in an acceptable time frame so that
the vendors are able to
submit their techno-commercial offers on due date. The
clarifications should be given in writ
ing to all the vendor
s by the technical
managers. However, it should be ensure
d that the parameters of RFP (SQRs)
should not be changed/ amended at this stag
e. Similarly, Paragraph 35 of
DPP-2006 stipulates that a technical
offer once submitted should not be
materially changed subsequently.
Ministry of Finance amongst other obser
vations on the process of procurement
had also observed (July
2009) that during the procurement process MoD had
sought approval for eight deviations fr
om RFP/DPP under Paragraph 75 of the
DPP by the RM as mentioned below.
seeking additional commercial quotation from both vendors;
acceptance of different warranty stipulation;
acceptance of partial compliance
of two ORs by AW-101 helicopter;
completion of helicopter delivery in
39 months instead of 36 months;
acceptance of option clause for three
years instead of five years;
incorporation of rear Airstairs
in the four non-VIP helicopters;
requirement of additional items such as TCAS-II, EGPWS and
Lifeport Medevac system; and
deletion of active MAWS.
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 24
We observed that:
The RFP required a warranty of 3 year
s/900 hours “whichever is later”.
The term “whichever is later”
was not acceptable to both the
shortlisted vendors. Hence, the term
“whichever is later” was changed
to “whichever is earlie
r”. Ministry stated in
its reply (March 2013)
that approval of the RM was obtai
ned for this deviation on the ground
that helicopters were practically
not expected to fly more than 900
hours in the first three ye
ars. The deviation in the warranty claim is in
contravention of the Policy Page
of Communication Squadron of Air
HQ which
inter alia
specifies that a helicopte
r is required to fly 540
hours per year and thus a total of 1620 flying hours in three years. We
also observed that MoD had pr
ovided for purchase spares and
associated equipment from the vendor
in the contract on the basis of
annual flying task of 540 hours per year. Thus by accepting warranty
only for 900 flying hours/three years ‘w
hichever is earlier’, flying risk
of 720 hours for spares was not covered under the warranty for each
helicopter. By including the term “whichever is earlier” MoD has
diluted the warranty clause to its disadvantage.
Ministry stated (April 2013) that
change in requirement was accepted
as the term “whichever
is later” was open ended and the warranty limit
of three years would occur first. It
further stated that spares would be
consumed as per the actual ut
ilisation of the helicopters
.
The reply is not acceptable as, if th
e term “whichever is later” was
open ended, the same should not have
been included in the RFP in the
first place.
The RFP stipulated that the buyer
would have the option to place a
separate order before 5 years from th
e contract effectiv
e date limited to
50
per cent
of the helicopter and spares et
c. as per the costs set out in
the contract. Ministry st
ated in its reply (March
2013) that during the
discussion with the CNC, the ve
ndor stated that the AW-101 VVIP
helicopter was a limited production ve
rsion and it was not possible for
them to have the option clause as required by the RFP. The vendor
had insisted in view of the prevai
ling adverse world economic situation
since mid 2008 and extension of their commercial quote for another
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 25
two years, applicability of option
clause may be reduced to 3 years
only. The requirement was accepted by the CNC. We observed that
while the reduction in option period fr
om 5 to 3 years was in favour of
the vendor, the very inclusion of th
e clause in the RFP was avoidable
since there was no requirement for
additional helicopters for another
five years. Further, MoF in
response to MoD’s reply had also
observed (July 2009) that th
e financial load of option clause even for 3
years appeared to be infructuous.
Ministry stated (April 2013) that the
option clause is a standard term of
the contract under the DPP-2006 and hence was included. While
procurement of additional helicopt
ers was unlikely, there could be
possibility of purchase of add
itional spares/equipment based on
operating experience.
The reply is not acceptable as Mo
D had already provided for purchase
of spares and associated equipment
from the vendor in the contract on
the basis of annual flying task of
540 hours per year. Besides, in view
of Ministry’s own admission of the
fact that procurement of additional
helicopters would be unlikely, the op
tion clause in the contract was
avoidable.
The RFP included a SQR of a ‘dual
colour active Missile Approach
Warning System, (MAWS). However, M/s AgustaWestland offered
Passive MAWS for the helicopter in the technical bid later with the
approval of DPB. The vendor su
bmitted additional commercial quote
of Euro 20.90 Million for Active MA
WS for 12 helicopters which was
negotiated to Euro 16.98 Million by
the CNC. During the technical
level discussion at Air HQ the ve
ndor brought out that the Passive
MAWS was essential equipment as the DIRCM
8
can be integrated only
with Passive MAWS and not with Active MAWS. Therefore, the
Active MAWS may not be necessary. Consequently, CNC deleted the
requirement from the proposal and
deviation to this SQR was accorded
by the RM. Ministry stated (March
2013) that the deviation did not
affect the basic character/profile of
the proposal or disturb the level
playing field and ultimate result wa
s a procurement that complied with
the stipulation of the RFP. We obser
ved that technical suitability of
8
DIRCM – Directed Infra Red Counter Measures
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 26
Active MAWS and consequently its
integration with other Electronic
Warfare equipment was not adequa
tely addressed by the IAF while
finalising the SQRs for the helicopter which had prolonged the
negotiation period, first in deliberati
on for inclusion and later due to
deletion of Active MAWS requirement.
The intention of Paragraph 75 appears that it is to be invoked in exceptional
circumstances for certain contingencies or exigencies which may have arisen
subsequent to the issue of th
e RFP. In this case, the
frequent exercise of this
procedure are counter to the principal
aim with which the paragraph has been
incorporated in the DPP-2006. These de
viations obtained in the procurement
process were also commented upon (July 2009) by MoF.
12 Excess procurement of helicopters
In August 1999, IAF had proposed for acqui
sition of eight helicopters (five in
VIP configuration and three in Non-VI
P configuration) with a view to
maintain six serviceable helicopters.
This was followed up by the issue of a
RFP in March 2002. IAF/MoD was of th
e view that eight helicopters would
meet the requirement if Mi-8 type helicopters were used for the VVIP
movement. Subsequently, at the insi
stence of SPG, the requirement was
increased (October 2005) to
12 helicopters (eight in
VIP configuration and
four in Non-VIP configuration) and
AoN for procurement of 12 helicopters
was accorded in January 2006. This resulted
in increase in contract cost which
was concluded in February 2010 by
`
1240 crore.
Ministry stated (March 2013) that in or
der to meet the opera
tional and security
requirements projected by SPG, th
e quantity of helicopters was increased from
8 to 12. The requirement projected by
SPG specified that ‘X’ number of
similar type helicopters were deployed
for a particular movement of VVIP.
Ministry also emphasized that the number of helicopters that can be used for
carrying VVIPs has remained eight in number.
We observed that the past trend of low utilisation levels (29
per cent
approx)
over a period of 11 years (1999-2010) of
the existing fleet of
eight helicopters
by VVIPs and rest of the flying for the training and use by the OEPs
9
does not
9
OEPs – Other Entitled Persons
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 27
lend credence to Ministry’s justifi
cation for additional procurement of
helicopters. This apprehension wa
s also expressed by the RM.
Ministry further stated (April 2013)
that the reasons for adding four
helicopters for non-VVIP version cannot be
linked to the util
isation level of
the helicopters in the
Communication Squadron.
The reply of Ministry is not accepta
ble as the Communication Squadron was
managing the service of air transportati
on for VVIPs with the fleet of eight
Mi-8 helicopters till present. As
such, additional proc
urement of four
helicopters costing
`
1240 crore was avoidable.
13 Delay in procurement
The DPP-2006 has indicated the time frame for
each activity at Paragraph 74
Chapter- I, Appendix C to avoid delays
in procurement. We observed delay in
some of the activities with reference to the prescribed time schedule as given
in Annexure-I.
We also observed that there were si
gnificant delays in finalization of
procurement even though it was directed by the PMO to process the
acquisition on fast track. Even the
CCS observed that IAF/MoD had taken
more than three years for the tendering
process and field evaluation since the
issue of revised RFP (September 2006). Su
ch delays, despite
the fact that the
procurement process had been initia
ted in 1999, lacked justification.
Accepting the facts, Ministry
stated in its reply (March 2013) that there was a
delay as total time taken was 10 years a
nd six months upto finalisation of the
contract. It also stated that the TTL of
the helicopter has now been extended
upto 2014.
14 Non-compliance with Offset Provisions
Paragraph 22 of DPP-2006,
inter alia,
makes it obligatory for inclusion of an
offset clause in all contracts
where indicative cost is above
`
300 crore and the
schemes are categorized as ‘Buy (Globa
l)’ involving outright purchase from
foreign / Indian vendors. The DPP prescribes a minimum of 30
per cent
of the
indicative cost of acquisiti
on as offset obligation.
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 28
For the purpose of defence purchas
es made under the DPP-2006, offset
obligations shall be discharged direc
tly by any combination of the following
methods:
(a)
Direct purchase of, or executing e
xport orders for, defence products
and components manufactured by,
or services provided by, Indian
defence industries, i.e., Defence Public Sector Undertakings, the
Ordnance Factory Board, and a
ny private defence industry
manufacturing these products or
components under an industrial
licence granted for such manufact
ure. For the purpose of defence
offset, “services” will mean mainte
nance, overhaul, upgradation, life
extension, engineering, design, testi
ng, defence related software or
quality assurance services.
(b) Direct foreign investment in In
dian defence industries for industrial
infrastructure for services, co-development,
joint ventures and
co-production of defence products.
(c) Direct foreign investment in Indi
an organisations engaged in research
in defence R&D as certified by De
fence Offset Facilitation Agency
(DOFA).
Paragraph 22 ‘Appendix D’ of DPP-2006 states
inter alia
that the offset
obligations are to be fu
lfilled coterminous within
the period of the main
contract. The vendor has to submit
the year-wise break up in offset
programme regarding fulfillmen
t of the offset obligation.
AgustaWestland had identified seven programmes which were to be
completed as part of the offset contract
. During scrutiny of the offset contract
of AgustaWestland, we observed that o
ffsets were allowed which were not
compliant with the DPP provi
sions as discussed below:
(i) Ineligible offset – Creation of civil infrastructure
As per programme Sl.No.1 of the offs
et contract, AgustaWestland has to
establish a VVIP support centre to
support the IAF for VVIP operation in
Delhi through Taneja Aerospace and Av
iation Company, an
Indian Offset
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 29
Partner (IOP) as a direct fore
ign investment. This package
inter alia
included,
build or refurbishment of hangars, stores
and office areas as a Direct Foreign
Investment (DFI) in infrastructure.
As per DPP-2006, construction of civil
infrastructure was not a valid
offset for discharge of o
ffset obligation. In reply
to an audit query (October 2011), Air HQ stated (December 2011) that if the
vendor claims offset credit for civil infr
astructure, this would not be allowed
during vetting of quarterly
reports. The reply does not
address the issue as to
how in the absence of an am
endment to the contract, th
e deficit in discharge of
offsets would be met, if the claim
is disallowed. The acceptance of an
inadmissible item for fulfillment of offset obligation and its inclusion in the
contract was in deviation of the DPP-2006.
Ministry stated (April 2013) that ve
ndor has submitted (September 2012) a
proposal seeking contract amendment th
at deletes the construction of civil
infrastructure and has included
only defence related activities.
However, Ministry’s reply is silent
whether the proposal of the vendor has
been accepted and any amendment to the c
ontract is issued.
The fact remains
that an inadmissible item was included in the offset contract.
(ii)
Inclusion of already completed
work in the offset contract
Programme Sl. No. 3 of the offset c
ontract catered for Engineering Design
services to be provided through an IOP,
IDS Infotech. As per original TEC
report of March 2008, DOFA opined that this did not constitute an offset
programme under the offset policy unless th
e same is treated as export orders.
Therefore, DOFA had sought necessary cl
arification on this issue. It was
clarified by AgustaWestland that the cu
rrent package of work with the IDS
Infotech was a discrete p
ackage of work involving th
e translation of current
drawings into a CATIA format associated
with the AW-129 he
licopter. To that
extent AgustaWestland proposed that th
is current programme of work with
IDS Infotech be considered as qualif
ying as an offset credit against the
engineering design servi
ce project. The proposal was accepted by Air HQ,
which limited the offset credit to the di
rect purchase/executing export orders
for services. However, in the Techni
cal Offset Evaluation Committee (TOEC)
report of August 2008, the offset obligation requirement included only the size
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 30
of initial work package of 10,000 man-hour
s. We observed that the details
regarding type of services and export
orders to be executed by IDS Infotech
was not clearly indicated in the offset contract.
As per Quarterly Progress Report (QPR
) for August 2012, the work identified
under this project with IDS Infotech had been placed and completed prior to
award (February 2010) of the contract. Si
nce offset credit was not admissible
for the same, AgustaWestland requested
(August 2012) an amendment in the
contract to delete IDS Infotech as IO
P and requested for adding a new IOP.
Till August 2012, the progress of offset
under this project was Nil.
AgustaWestland also gave an year-wis
e break up of work for the offset
programme from 2011 to 2014 even though
the work had been completed well
before the conclusion of the contract. Thus, the inclusion of this offset
programme in the contract was inadmissi
ble and was against the provisions of
the DPP-2006.
Ministry stated (April 2013) that effec
tive date of the main supply contract
was 08 February 2010 and offset credit would be admissible only for
purchases done after this
date. Ministry also stated
that the vendor had sought
(September 2012) contract amendment to combine offset programmes at
Sl. No.2 and 3 and to suitably amend the work package.
However, Ministry’s reply is silent
as to why already completed works were
accepted and included in the contract.
Also, Ministry has not offered its
comments on the issue of ambiguity in the
type of services and type of export
orders to be executed by
M/s IDS Infotech (IOP).
(iii)
Inclusion of project unlikely to be
completed within the contract
period
As per programme Sl. No. 7 of the offs
et contract, there is a provision for
manufacture and repair of
helicopter sub-assemblie
s and components through
IOPs
viz.
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Taneja Aerospace and Aviation
Company, Dynamatic Technologies Ltd.,
Pranita Engineering Solutions and
Sanghvi Aerospace (Private) Ltd at a co
st of 22.28 million Euro which pertain
to future Lynx helicopter packages of
AgustaWestland. Lynx helicopter is
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 31
neither available with IAF nor with the
Indian civil aviati
on. Since this is a
futuristic project, the possibility of discharge of offset obligations within the
period of contract is doubtful.
Besides, of the five IOPs, four
10
did not have
industrial license for the manufacture of
defence products at the time of
contract. In reply to
an audit observation (October 2011) Air HQ stated
(December 2011) that IAF had no plan to
induct Lynx helicopter in future.
The project was not linked to indigenous
demand and would result in true
capability building. Air HQ also stated th
at companies were requested to apply
for appropriate licenses.
The reply is not acceptable
because till August 2012 th
e progress in discharge
of offset obligation was Nil and theref
ore, the possibility of completion of
project within the period of main contract is unlikely. This is even more so
because AgustaWestland had also re
quested (August 2012) through a contract
amendment to add one more company Me
rlinhawk as additional IOP against
this project after deleting Sanghvi Aerosp
ace (Private) Ltd. Further, without
an industrial license for manufacture of
defence products, these offset partners
should not have been selected.
Ministry stated (April 2013) that TOEC
was aware that these IOPs were not
having industrial license for manufactur
e of defence products. Ministry also
stated that the vendor has confirmed (Mar
ch 2012) that out of five IOPs, four
have obtained the requisite produc
tion licence and the Sanghvi Aerospace
Pvt. Ltd, which did not have the requisit
e licence, has been deleted from IOP.
It further added that the re
sponsibility to complete the project in time lies with
the vendor and in case he failed to do
so, the penalties would be imposed as
per the provisions of the offset contract.
The reply is not acceptable as these IOPs
did not have the requisite license at
the time of acceptance of offset contract
. Besides, offset obligations have
remained unfulfilled upto August 2012, Ministry in its reply has also not
indicated whether the process of impos
ition of penalty on the vendor has been
initiated.
10
Taneja Aerospace and Aviation Company,
Dynamatic Technologies Ltd., Pranita
Engineering solutions and Sanghvi Aerospace (Private) Ltd
Acquisition of helicopters for VVIPs
Report No.10 of 2013 Page 32
15 Conclusion
The acquisition process for the VVIP helic
opters had to resort to several
deviations from the laid down procedures. The EH-101 helicopter (later
renamed as AW-101 of AgustaWestland)
could not be fiel
d evaluated in 2002
as it was certified to fly upto an alti
tude of 4572 metre only as against the
mandatory altitude requirement of 6000
metre stipulated in the RFP. The
procurement process was closed in
2003 by the MoD since the PMO had
observed that the SQRs so framed had
resulted in a singl
e vendor situation.
Subsequently, the SQRs were reframed
in 2006 with an objective to broad
base the competition and to avoid a resu
ltant single vendor situation. In the
revised RFP of 2006, the mandatory SQR of
altitude requirement was reduced
to 4500 metre and a cabin height of at
least 1.8 metre was introduced. While
the mandatory requirement of minimum cab
in height reduced the competition,
the lowering of altitude requirement was against the inescapable operational
requirement of 6000 metre. Even w
ith the revision of the SQRs, the
acquisition process again led to a resulta
nt single vendor situation in 2010 and
AW-101 AgustaWestland was selected.
As the acquisition process was inordina
tely delayed, IAF continued to face
operational disadvantage on ac
count of use of ageing
helicopters. A critical
requirement of replacement of ageing fl
eet of Mi-8 helicop
ters could not be
fulfilled even after thirteen years of initiation of the acquisition process, due to
failure of MoD/IAF to devise realistic SQRs.
Evaluation of helicopters following differe
nt methodologies could not give the
desired assurance, especially in the li
ght of the RM’s directives to provide
equal opportunity to shortlis
ted vendors for field tria
ls. Field Eval
uation Trial
(FET) was conducted abroad on the representative helicopters of
AgustaWestland and not on the actual
helicopter (AW-101) contracted. The
contracted helicopter was still in its developmental phase, as stated by the
vendor. Thus, the recommendation and assurance given by Chief of the Air
Staff (October 2007) to conduct FET abro
ad lacked justification.
While the intention of Paragraph 75 appe
ars that it is to be invoked in
exceptional circumstances for certain c
ontingencies or exig
encies which may
have arisen subsequent to the issue of
the RFP, in this case the frequent
exercise of this procedure are counter
to the principal
aim with which the
paragraph has been incor
porated in the DPP-2006.
No comments:
Post a Comment